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ESSAY
Golden Parachutes and the Limits of
Shareholder Voting
Albert H. Choi*
Andrew C.W. Lund**
Robert Schonlau***
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain change-in-control
payments (also known as “golden parachutes”) by giving shareholders the right
to approve or disapprove such payments on an advisory basis. This Essay is the
first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute
(“SOGP”) vote. We find that unlike shareholder votes on proposed mergers, there
is a significant amount of variation with respect to votes on golden parachutes.
Notwithstanding the variation, however, the SOGP voting regime is likely
ineffective in controlling golden parachute (“GP”) compensation. First, proxy
advisors seem more likely to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to
recommendations on SOGP votes. Second, shareholders are more likely to
adhere to advisor recommendations. Finally, the size of golden parachutes
appears to be increasing in the years since the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act
in 2010, and the golden parachutes that are amended immediately prior to
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SOGP votes tend to grow rather than shrink. These findings contrast with the
research that has examined Say on Pay (“SOP”), and we suggest that the
differences between the two regimes lie in the absence of second-stage, marketbased discipline for SOGP votes. We offer potential avenues for improving
SOGP’s ability to shape change-in-control compensation practices, such as
making SOGP votes (partially) binding, and making the GP payment and
SOGP voting information more readily available to shareholders of
corporations where the target directors also serve as directors of acquiring
corporations.
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INTRODUCTION
Since executive compensation became a highly salient political
issue in the 1980s, the federal government has repeatedly attempted to
influence pay setting for top managers at public companies. From tax
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nudges1 to mandatory clawbacks2 to enhanced disclosure
requirements,3 the regulatory interventions have been steady but of
uncertain impact.4 In more recent times, Congress and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have tried a new mechanism,
amplifying the voice of public company shareholders on executive
compensation by requiring advisory shareholder votes. The two
interventions that move in this direction, known as “Say on Pay” and
“Say on Golden Parachute,” were promulgated under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and promised to focus
shareholder outrage over problematic pay practices. Say on Pay (“SOP”)
asks shareholders to vote on the previous year’s executive pay practices
in their entirety, while Say on Golden Parachute (“SOGP”) asks
shareholders to vote on merger-related severance payments that would
become payable to executives when the change in control takes place.
SOP in the United States and its cousins around the world have
received a good deal of attention from both practitioners and scholars.5
To the surprise of some, a series of recent papers found that SOP,
though advisory, influences corporate behavior to respond to negative
1.
I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012) (amended 2017) (removing the exception to the deduction cap
for executive compensation of $1 million for performance-based pay, as part of the 2017 corporate
tax overhaul); I.R.C. § 280G(a) (2012) (excluding compensation deductions for excess golden
parachutes); I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2012) (imposing an excise tax for excess golden parachute
payments); see also Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 514 (2009).
2.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 15 U.S.C. § 78j4 (2012) (“The Commission shall, by rule, direct the national securities exchanges and national
securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that does not comply with
the requirements of this section.”). The SEC has issued a Proposed Rule. See Listing Standards for
Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,144 (proposed July 14, 2015)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 274) (proposing to amend § 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010).
3.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2019); Executive Compensation and Related Person
Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240,
245, 249, 274) (stating that the disclosure amendments would be effective November 7, 2006).
4.
See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive
Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 11, 11 (Randall S. Thomas & Jennifer
G. Hill eds., 2012) (“The emerging conclusion is that attempts to regulate CEO pay [including tax
interventions] have been mostly unblemished by success.”).
5.
See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy
Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951 (2013); Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber,
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527 (2013); Jill
Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm
Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101 (2018); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes
on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009)
(expressing concern that Say on Pay may cause a wealth-decreasing homogenization of pay
practices); Stephen Davis, Does “Say on Pay” Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation
Accountable
(2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/sites/
default/files/content/docs/Policy%20Briefing%20No%201%20’Say%20on%20Pay’.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SD6Z-4T9B].
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shareholder votes.6 At least some of the studies also present a sanguine
picture of proxy advisor recommendations as well as shareholder voting
itself.7 In short, SOP appears to be influencing executive annual pay
practices (at least partially) in line with the hopes of those who
advocated for its adoption.
In this paper, we look at the other “Say on” compensation
provision in Dodd-Frank. Utilizing hand-collected data on golden
parachutes (“GPs”), we analyze the first six years of experience with
SOGP votes to answer questions surrounding this expansion of
shareholder power: how proxy advisors have responded to the new vote,
how shareholders utilize this new power, and how effective the law has
been in influencing pay practices. Our central finding is that SOGP does
not function like SOP and, in fact, may be substantially less effective.
On the surface, this is surprising since both voting rules share
strikingly similar characteristics. Both were enacted via the same
legislation and rulemaking process.8 Both rely on advisory voting by the
same groups of shareholders, who are advised by the same proxy
advisors.9 Both cover highly public and controversial matters of
executive pay.
Yet important differences separate the two. Because SOP is an
advisory vote,10 its impact necessarily relies on indirect pressures
placed on corporate directors. Most commonly, this entails an implicit
or explicit threat to subsequently remove directors or discipline

6.
See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 126–28 (discussing the influence of SOP on corporate
boards and concerns that it may cause boards to focus on short-term metrics to the detriment of
long-term value).
7.
See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 952–56 (describing the study on shareholder
voting, finding that the resulting data were “[c]ontrary to critics’ concerns,” and suggesting that
the proxy advisors do not seem to be making one-size-fits-all recommendations and the
shareholders do not seem to be just rubber-stamping the recommendations); see also Randall S.
Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213 (2012) (evaluating preDodd-Frank experiments on SOP).
8.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
9.
There are a small number of proxy advisor firms, which, among others, make
recommendations to institutional shareholders (such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity) on
how they should exercise their voting rights. The firms include Institutional Shareholder Services
(“ISS”), Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance. ISS is known to have the largest market
share and the most influence. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy
Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (finding that ISS has the most influence
“partially due to the fact that ISS (to a greater extent than other advisors) bases its
recommendations on factors that shareholders consider important”).
10. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (“In
addition to their non-binding status, none of the shareholder votes required pursuant to Section
14A is to be construed ‘as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors.’ ”)).
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executives who fail to respond to shareholder disapproval. That is, given
that the same set of directors will likely be up for reelection the
subsequent year and that the same set of executives remains in charge,
the shareholders can presumably impose discipline at the subsequent
shareholder meeting if those managers were unresponsive to the earlier
negative shareholder reaction.11 Executives are likely to balance their
desire for more compensation with the need to safeguard their
relationship with shareholders who will exert influence over the firm
going forward.
The potential for future discipline of managers is more limited
in the SOGP context. Directors, including the ones who approved the
executives’ golden parachutes, will not be up for reelection by the same
SOGP shareholders since the takeover triggering the golden parachute
usually spells the end of the directors’ service at the firm and marks the
advent of a vastly different shareholder base.12 Furthermore, executives
who might be asked to renegotiate golden parachutes in the face of
shareholder pressure may have little incentive to appease shareholders
since their employment with the firm is usually ending as well.13 In the
absence of any explicit or implicit disciplinary mechanism, directors
and executives may have little or no incentive to eschew outsized
change-in-control severance payments.14 In short, there are good
reasons to believe that SOGP may not prove as effective as SOP in
putting downward pressure on compensation.15
Theory thus suggests that the effectiveness of an SOGP regime
in constraining GPs may be compromised compared to SOP’s ability to
constrain compensation more broadly. If so, we would expect to observe
relatively little effect on golden parachute incidence and sizes after the
11. In fact, Dodd-Frank requires companies to disclose detailed information on how they have
responded to the previous year’s shareholder SOP votes in the next year’s proxy. See id. at 6015
(amending Item 402(b) to disclose how a company “considered the results of previous shareholder
[say-on-pay] votes”). Although this is largely for informational purposes, to the extent that
shareholders could exert indirect pressure, the information disclosure can be quite useful.
12. The fact that Dodd-Frank’s drafters thought it unnecessary to add an informational
provision about management’s response to an SOGP vote (as they did for the response to an SOP
vote) demonstrates the point.
13. Also, to the extent that the burden of paying severance payments is borne, at least
partially, by the buyer, target shareholders may be less sensitive to the size of the payment.
14. Although the primary focus of this Essay is on change-in-control severance payments, an
interesting comparison could be made to severance payments made to executives in a non-takeover
context, for example, when an executive’s employment has been voluntarily or involuntarily
terminated by the board in the absence of a takeover. In such a setting, the implicit pressure on
the directors is presumably still in place, and empirical examination is needed to determine
whether the presence of such indirect pressure can moderate non-change-in-control severance pay
to the top executives. We intend to follow up on this line of research.
15. Indeed, every deal lawyer with whom we have spoken claims to operate as though the
votes have no impact at all.
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onset of SOGP. We would expect few, if any, last-minute amendments
ahead of an SOGP vote aimed at mollifying shareholders about to vote
on golden parachutes. Also, we would expect to observe a number of
other dissimilarities with the SOP experience. To the extent that their
institutional shareholder clients care less about the issue, proxy
advisors’ recommendations may be more likely to rely on simple, onesize-fits-all criteria so as to economize their resources. Relatedly, actual
SOGP votes may be more highly correlated with proxy advisor
recommendations if shareholders are less willing to expend their own
resources to sort through the merits of SOGP votes.16 Finally, there may
be less SOGP dissent than SOP dissent overall if shareholders perceive
little chance of effecting a change in golden parachutes.
This Essay empirically assesses these hypotheses in order to
shed light on the experience with SOGP. Specifically, we aim to assess
the basic question of SOGP’s consequentiality for golden parachute pay
practices. In doing so, this Essay adds to the literature evaluating
advisory votes at public companies17 and the behavior and influence of
proxy advisory firms.18 Our empirical assessment can be divided into
three questions. First, we examine which factors are related to (or
possibly influence) proxy advisor recommendations. We have collected
data on recommendations since the inception of SOGP from
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the dominant proxy advisory
firm, and we find that several attributes are correlated with ISS’s SOGP
recommendations.19 For instance, we find that the size of a golden
parachute is significantly related to ISS’s “against” recommendations.
Since 2013, ISS has explicitly stated that it looks for problematic
provisions in golden parachutes—tax gross-ups, single triggers, and
cash awards that are three or more times larger than annual pay20—
when making its recommendation decisions. Although the data are not
readily available on whether components of the golden parachute are
single or double triggers, we are able to at least corroborate that the
presence of a tax gross-up provision is significantly and positively
related to ISS’s “against” recommendations, consistent with ISS’s
stated policy.

16. Comparing the degrees of correlation with other studies is not an easy task given that the
empirical specifications and the questions posed may differ substantially. Hence, we do not intend
to make an absolute claim here.
17. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role
of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009); Choi et al., supra note 9; Ertimur et al., supra
note 5.
19. See Choi et al., supra note 9.
20. See infra Part I for a more detailed discussion of these attributes.
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Second, we look to find the determinants of shareholder SOGP
voting outcomes. Despite the lack of a strong disciplinary mechanism,
we do find that shareholders, on occasion, vote against golden
parachutes rather than simply rubber-stamping them.21 As to what
determines such outcomes, we find that ISS “against” recommendations
have by far the most explanatory power for voting and likely more than
has been found with respect to SOP voting. While it remains difficult to
directly compare our results with those from the SOP studies, the result
seems to support the hypothesis that shareholders do not take SOGP
as seriously as they do SOP.22 At the same time, the firm’s prior
performance, as measured by the return on assets (“ROA”), also seems
to play an independent, albeit lesser, role in determining voting
outcomes. That is, the firms that perform better financially seem to
attract less dissent from their shareholders. The latter result is
consistent with existing scholarship on SOP that shows firm
performance is correlated with voting outcomes.23
Third and finally, we examine the effect of SOGP on golden
parachutes. The examination is divided into two parts. First, looking at
the broad trends in golden parachutes, we examine how they evolved
before and after the advent of SOGP under Dodd-Frank. Even though
SOGP itself may lack any direct disciplinary force, one possibility may
be that SOGP puts some indirect pressure on the growth of golden
parachutes over time. However, when we look at the absolute size of
golden parachute obligations taken on by firms in their contracts with
CEOs, we find that they grew at a faster rate after the adoption of
SOGP than before, even after controlling for an extensive set of
plausible controls including CEO compensation levels generally. When
we look at the ratio of golden parachutes to annual compensation, on
the other hand, we do not find any evidence of this change in the growth
rate. At minimum, SOGP does not seem to be suppressing golden
parachutes. Second, utilizing our hand-collected data, we look at
changes to golden parachutes during the period one year prior to the
21. The fact that the shareholders actually express their voice on advisory SOGP, along with
the fact that the proxy advisory firms, including ISS, make somewhat tailored recommendations
on SOGP, raises an interesting question. Even though the advisory vote is nonbinding and there
may be few implicit discipline mechanisms against the directors and the executives, we suspect
that the institutional shareholders may be exercising their voting rights under SOGP so as to
satisfy their fiduciary obligations to their own investors. This, in turn, will create an incentive to
the proxy advisory firms to provide a few more meaningful recommendations to their own client
base. In short, even though the votes are purely advisory and there may be no other market-based
sanctioning mechanism, based on the institutional shareholders’ own fiduciary obligations, there
would be some correlation between how they vote and the attributes of golden parachutes.
22. See supra note 16 on comparing regression coefficient estimates from different empirical
studies.
23. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 973–78; Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 124.
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public announcement of a deal through its closing to see if firms amend
existing golden parachutes in anticipation of SOGP votes.24 We find
that firms that amend golden parachutes during the run-up to a deal
are more likely to experience increases (rather than reductions) in the
value of the previously disclosed golden parachute promises than are
firms that do not amend their contracts. This suggests that firms do not
act out of fear of negative shareholder votes, contrary to the experience
with SOP.
Our findings suggest that SOGP may not be achieving its
desired purpose of constraining golden parachutes. To the extent that
one believes golden parachutes reflect arms-length bargaining among
executives, boards that are faithful to the shareholders, and potentially,
acquirers, this may be of little consequence. If, on the other hand, one
believes golden parachutes are often inefficient contractual terms
requiring regulatory intervention, this poses a problem. Based on our
empirical findings, we suggest a few policy changes to the existing
regime. One answer to SOGP’s inconsequentiality is to make the vote
binding somehow. Unlike SOP votes, SOGP votes are taken before (and
not after) the executives are to receive the severance payments. By
making the SOGP votes binding, we can provide a more meaningful
formal disciplinary tool to the shareholders. Another possibility is to try
to harness the implicit, market-based discipline on the directors and the
executives through more robust disclosure.25 We focus on two groups in
particular: the target company directors who also serve (or expect to
serve) as directors for other companies and the directors of the
acquiring corporation. For instance, to the extent that the target
company directors also serve as directors at other companies and
approve golden parachutes that receive strong negative votes from
target shareholders, disclosing this fact to the other companies’
shareholders might allow those shareholders to discipline the directors.

24. In an earlier study, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack also examine the last minute increase
in executive compensation, either through augmentation of golden parachutes, special cash
bonuses, or post-merger employment. Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What’s in It for
Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 39 (2004). They show that, in cases
where the CEOs receive such extra compensation, target shareholders’ returns from the merger
are lower. Id. at 59. The study reflects mergers between 1995 and 1997 and thus does not consider
the impact of SOGP. Id. at 41. They also find GP amendments in only 12% of firms during the runup to a deal, but they focus on the cash severance component of GPs rather than the broader
universe of amendments that we study. Id. at 46.
25. A growing body of literature examines the role the law plays in facilitating reputational
sanctions by providing relevant information to the market participants. See, e.g., Scott Baker &
Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559 (2015) [hereinafter Baker
& Choi, Contract’s Role]; Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly
Legal Sanctions Can Work Better than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2018)
[hereinafter Baker & Choi, Reputation and Litigation].
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The Essay is organized as follows. In Part I, we review the
structure and practice of golden parachutes, including the recent
legislative changes that require shareholders’ advisory votes at public
companies facing potential changes in control. We also discuss ISS’s
recommendation guidelines with respect to such votes. In Part II, the
core of the Essay, we present our empirical analyses of SOGP. We start
with a brief description of the datasets we use, along with descriptive
statistics of the data, and present the empirical results that show: (1)
what determines ISS’s voting recommendations; (2) how shareholders
vote; and (3) how golden parachutes have changed over time (before and
after the legislative change), including for those companies that expect
an imminent change in control. Part III presents a few policy
implications based on the empirical findings, and the last Part
concludes with suggestions for future research.
I. GOLDEN PARACHUTES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ ADVISORY VOTES ON
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. An Introduction to Golden Parachutes
On February 4, 2015, beleaguered retailers Office Depot and
Staples entered into a merger agreement under which Staples would
acquire Office Depot and Office Depot shareholders would receive a
combination of cash and Staples shares.26 If the deal was consummated,
Office Depot’s Chairman and CEO, Roland Smith, would no longer
serve as the top executive and would become entitled to over $47 million
in cash, accelerated equity, and other benefits.27 Institutional
Shareholder Services recommended its clients vote in favor of the
merger but against management with respect to the Say-on-GoldenParachute vote.28 At a meeting on June 19 of the same year, the merger
was approved by Office Depot shareholders with 447,184,660 votes for
and 748,824 votes against, or over 99% in favor.29 On the other hand,
the SOGP vote was met with approval by only 246,680,492 shares in
favor as opposed to 201,100,277 against, only a 55% to 45% margin.30
26. Office Depot, Inc., Annual Proxy Statement (Schedule 14a) (May 15, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312515190524/d892614ddefm14a.htm
[https://perma.cc/5AH9-MC8K].
27. See id. at 83 (setting out golden parachute compensation for Office Depot executives).
28. This information was derived from the ISS Company Vote Results database, one of the
sources we used to compile data for this project. See infra Section II.A.
29. Office
Depot,
Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(June
19,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312515230133/d945744d8k.htm
[https://perma.cc/6UYN-3UCN].
30. Id.
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The Office Depot-Staples merger was eventually cancelled for antitrust
reasons,31 and Smith retired soon after with a payout of less than $11
million.32 But what caused ISS to recommend against Smith’s GP?
What caused shareholders to vote so differently on the related
proposals? And why did Smith and Office Depot appear to do nothing
ahead of the SOGP vote to avoid a potentially embarrassing loss? In
short, the Office Depot example causes one to wonder how SOGP works
and whether it matters.
Large U.S. firms adopted golden parachutes in significant
numbers beginning in the early 1980s, ostensibly as a way to lubricate
the takeover market.33 An active takeover market allows acquirers to
buy undervalued firms by sharing a portion of any potentially unlocked
value with the selling shareholders via a deal premium.34 This process
often involves replacing incumbent management, which gives those
managers incentives to avoid the takeover.35 The threat of a takeover
might lead incumbent managers to perform better in order to avoid
31. See Michael J. de la Merced & Rachel Abrams, Office Depot and Staples Call Off Merger
After
Judge
Blocks
It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
10,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/business/dealbook/staples-office-depot-merger.html
[https://perma.cc/W6ZL-GUSZ] (“A federal judge . . . blocked a $6.3 billion proposed merger of
Staples and Office Depot, dashing another huge deal and handing the Obama administration one
more antitrust victory.”).
32. Office Depot, Inc., Annual Proxy Statement (Schedule 14a), 71 (May 4, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312518087753/d533814ddef14a.htm#rom
533814_ [https://perma.cc/UA5S-MTDD].
33. See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive DecisionMaking, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 183–85 (1985) (discussing the incentive
alignment hypothesis of golden parachutes, which “assumes that the compensation
provided . . . has a favorable influence on top management’s reaction to takeover bids”).
34. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1981) (“A cash tender offer typically
presents shareholders of the ‘target’ corporation with the opportunity to sell many if not all of their
shares quickly and at a premium over the market price.”); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819
(1981) (“[A]n offer provides shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares for a substantial
premium over market price.”); Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110, 115–17 (1965) (describing the process of direct purchase of shares). Even when a
company is not being mismanaged and/or undervalued, an acquirer may decide to purchase the
company for other reasons, such as synergies. To the extent that the target management may be
against such acquisitions, golden parachutes can still function as an inducement.
35. See, e.g., Lambert & Larcker, supra note 33, at 184:
There are three aspects of the loss incurred by the managers of target firms. First, the
manager does not receive wages until he finds new employment. Second, the manager
may not be paid as much in his new job. This can arise if the manager possesses firmspecific human capital or if the incentive plan of his former company was structured to
pay him less than his marginal product in the early part of his career and more than
his marginal product later in his career. When the executive is terminated, he loses the
additional late period payout because his new company has no incentive to pay him
more than his marginal product. Finally, the manager loses any non-pecuniary benefits
of his position, including his power and prestige.
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becoming a target in the first place.36 But other avoidance techniques
are also available, with incumbent managers often in a position to resist
takeovers by virtue of their control and their relationship with their
board.37
Firms adjusted their arrangements with executives, in part, to
solve the problem of incumbent recalcitrance.38 Stock and option
awards became common forms of compensation, and their values
increased and often vested upon a takeover, providing incumbents with
a possible windfall even if they might later be fired. Still, the pain of
termination may not have been entirely eliminated for managers with
significant firm-specific human capital investments or access to the
private benefits of control. Golden parachutes helped to further
encourage incumbent managers to accept takeover bids by promising
them additional payments. Specifically, golden parachutes promise
that, for a period of time following (and, in some cases, for a period of
time prior to) a change in control, the acquiring company will pay target
managers enhanced severance if terminated under certain
circumstances.39
Golden parachutes commonly define a “change in control” as a
merger, the acquisition of some percentage of company shares, or the
turnover of a majority of the incumbent board.40 In some cases, this
36. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of
Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 126 (1989) (“We assume that control
mechanisms such as . . . hostile takeovers are only partially effective. It is in the interest of the
manager to make them less effective. We show how manager-specific investments help the
manager reduce the threat of replacement.”).
37. The most famous entrenchment device is the poison pill, which effectively prevents
takeovers unless they are approved by the target’s board. See, e.g., id. The pill may be particularly
effective when coupled with a staggered board, which prevents a hostile buyer from taking control
of the board in two or more election cycles. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV &
Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002). But more subtle subversion tools are available to target
managers. See, e.g., Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017
BYU L. REV. 67, 90–91:
Targets generally rely on their CEO to negotiate the merger agreement. This position
gives the CEO considerable discretion to negotiate personal benefits into the agreement
that is sent to the board. . . . [I]f the CEO leaves prior to closing or otherwise become
uncooperative during negotiations, this could destroy a great deal of the firm’s value to
the acquirer. The CEO’s holdup power makes it especially hard and costly for the board
to replace her as primary negotiator on behalf of the firm. The CEO can use such holdup
power to bargain for personal benefits. (footnotes omitted).
38. For more on these devices, see Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Golden Parachutes,
Severance, and Firm Value, 68 FLA. L. REV. 875 (2017).
39. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 834 (2002) (discussing the use of golden
parachutes to discourage CEOs blocking takeovers). Some single-trigger GPs do not require a
subsequent termination.
40. Sales of substantially all assets of the company are usually covered as well.
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“single trigger” activates payment obligations on the part of the firm
even when the executives continue their employment with the
combined entity. However, more often a number of subsequent
termination scenarios serve as a “double trigger” that results in the
golden parachute payment.41 Those scenarios usually involve a
termination by the company without “cause” or a resignation by the
CEO for “good reason.”42 The standard golden parachute consists of
various components, including a cash payment articulated as a multiple
of an executive’s salary and bonus. Often, executives are to receive
continued perks for a period of time and perhaps enhanced
contributions to retirement plans.43 The equity compensation plan
under which stock awards have been made or the merger agreement
will frequently call for automatic vesting of this equity upon the change
in control, but if not, the golden parachute may require accelerated
vesting. Finally, golden parachutes may call for gross-ups to make
executives whole for excise taxes they may incur under Section 4999 of
the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).44
It remains an open question whether golden parachutes increase
or decrease shareholder wealth. They might increase shareholder
wealth by encouraging more takeovers at premiums to current share
prices. One of us has argued that golden parachutes can also allow the
current shareholders to shift compensation costs onto future
shareholders.45 Golden parachutes might also encourage managers to

41. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 259 (2006).
42. See generally id. at 253 (discussing “good reason” triggers, which include diminution in
responsibilities, diminution in compensation, and forced relocation).
43. In our hand-collected sample, we find these “other” amounts at 76% of firms that make
some sort of GP promise.
44. See I.R.C. § 4999 (2012) (imposing excise tax on recipient of excess parachute payment).
That excise tax (along with a loss of deduction on the company side under Section 280G) came
about when Congress first attempted to rein in GPs in 1984. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Section 4999
imposes a 20% excise tax on executives receiving “excess” parachute payments, i.e., payments
above three times the executive’s average compensation during the period prior to the deal. I.R.C.
§ 4999. Until the adoption of Section 409A in 2004, which restricted payment of deferred
compensation to executives, GPs were the only terms in an executive employment agreement
subject to their own special tax penalty. See I.R.C. § 409A (2012) (amended 2018). The recently
repealed § 162(m) of the I.R.C. also imposed tax consequences on high levels of pay that are not
sufficiently “performance-based.” See Mullane, supra note 1 at 519–26; Gregg D. Polsky,
Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 884
(2007) (“Section 162(m) was intended both to reduce the overall level of executive compensation
and to make such compensation more sensitive to firm performance.”).
45. See, e.g., Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 170 (2004) (suggesting that because the incidence of GPs is partly born by the
acquirer, GPs can permit target shareholders to shift some of their compensation burden onto
acquirers).
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pursue more valuable but risky projects and manage for the long term
by reducing the penalties for short-term failure normally associated
with takeovers.46
On the other hand, recent academic criticisms of golden
parachutes have focused on the potential for these contracts to actually
exacerbate agency costs at public firms.47 Specifically, by making
terminations less painful, golden parachutes might create effort
disincentives for CEOs.48 Recent research suggested that golden
parachute adoptions may be associated with subsequent declines in
firm value.49 Even if they do not produce perverse incentives, golden
parachutes may divert more of the deal premium away from
shareholders than is strictly necessary to overcome executive
resistance.50 To that extent, shareholders at the target firm may
understandably believe that their payout in a takeover has been
reduced because a larger golden parachute was awarded to their CEO.
Even if they believe that some amount of compensation was necessary
or appropriate to encourage the deal, higher-than-necessary golden
parachutes might lead to shareholder dissatisfaction over the lost
opportunity. In fact, some institutional shareholders have fought with
portfolio firms over what they viewed as excessive golden parachutes,
going so far as to threaten to vote against a proposed merger.51
46. See Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investments,
and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2015) (“With [golden parachutes], managers are
assured of realizing the long-term value of their work even if the company is acquired, and as a
result, they are more likely to specifically invest in the firm.”).
47. There are, of course, other criticisms of golden parachutes, mostly centered on concerns
for distributive justice. See, e.g., Paul G. Wilhelm, Application of Distributive Justice Theory to the
CEO Pay Problem: Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 469, 472–73 (1993) (“[W]hy
should golden parachutes be available only to a few top executives and not to the many other
management team members?”).
48. Presumably, however, shareholders (represented by the compensation committee
directors) can offset such a perverse incentive through an increase in the normal pay-forperformance sensitivity, accomplished by, for instance, relying more on stock options, grants, or
just plain old bonuses.
49. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles Wang, Golden Parachutes and the
Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 140, 150–51 (2014) (discussing the ways that golden
parachutes might decrease firm value by “contribut[ing] to managerial slack” and creating a
“ ‘selling-out’ effect”). In another paper, two of us questioned recent empirical work suggesting that
golden parachutes are associated with decreases in firm value. See Lund & Schonlau, supra note
38, at 905 (observing that basic severance promises, rather than enhanced severance under golden
parachutes, may be responsible for the correlations between golden parachutes and firm value
declines observed by others).
50. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 33, at 185 (“[T]he GP increases the cost
of . . . conducting a takeover and dismissing management. That is, the GP contract requires the
acquiring firm to retain and/or compensate executives that it might prefer to terminate. This
reduces the takeover premium that the acquiring firm is willing to pay.”).
51. See Treasurer, CalPERS Seek to End “Golden Parachutes” from Mergers, CEDAR VALLEY
BUS. MONTHLY (Aug. 14, 2004), https://wcfcourier.com/business/local/treasurer-calpers-seek-to-
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B. Advisory Votes and Executive Compensation
Perhaps unsurprisingly, shareholders are not the only ones that
have been dissatisfied with golden parachutes. Since they achieved
critical mass within public companies in the 1980s, these contracts have
also been a popular political target. Until the enactment of the DoddFrank Act with its requirement of SOGP votes, the most concrete
legislative attack on golden parachutes came in 1986 when Congress
established the excise tax for “excess” ones with a corresponding loss of
compensation deductions for the firm.52 To be an “excess” golden
parachute, the total amount paid to the executive must exceed three
times the executive’s “base amount,” understood to be the average of
the five prior years’ taxable compensation.53 If that occurs, the paying
firm cannot deduct the compensation for purposes of the corporate
income tax and, more importantly for practical purposes, the recipient
must pay a 20% excise tax on top of normal income taxes.54 Private
companies may avoid these consequences by obtaining shareholder
approval of the payments prior to the merger, but public companies may
not avail themselves of this escape route.55
More recently, Congress and the SEC have shifted gears in the
fight against excessive golden parachutes and now rely more on
shareholders to police these arrangements. First, the SEC adopted
enhanced disclosure requirements surrounding compensation
generally—and golden parachutes specifically—so that shareholders
might better understand the promises being made to executives.56 To
channel any resulting outrage, the Dodd-Frank Act included two
advisory votes.
First came a requirement that public companies submit the
entirety of their “top five” compensation arrangements to a shareholder

end-golden-parachutes-from-mergers/article_6db197d2-27e6-5753-8873-06ddc53ac734.html
[https://perma.cc/F48Z-3M28] (stating that the board of the California Public Employees’
Retirement System plans to vote against a prospective merger to fight against costly corporate
executive severance packages).
52. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
53. I.R.C. § 280G (2012).
54. Id.; I.R.C. § 4999 (2012). As discussed above, the target company can promise to
neutralize the effect of this additional excise tax on the recipients by further “grossing up” the total
severance payments.
55. I.R.C. § 280G.
56. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012). Item 5 of
Schedule 14A mandated disclosure of “any substantial interest, direct or indirect, by security
holdings or otherwise, of any person who has been an executive officer or director since the
beginning of the last fiscal year in any matter to be acted upon,” so many firms already disclosed
such information. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
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SOP vote.57 The SOP provision in Dodd-Frank introduced in 2009
mirrored a provision introduced by Representative Frank two years
earlier before the financial crisis exploded. SOP followed similar
regimes adopted in the UK and a number of other jurisdictions since
2000.58 It covers all pay received by top executives, including golden
parachutes.59 Unlike the revised UK version in place since 2013, the
vote is not binding on firms.60
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act required public companies to
submit golden parachutes to an SOGP advisory shareholder vote to be
held simultaneously with any shareholder vote on a change in control.61
Thus, golden parachutes are the only term in CEO compensation
contracts that are subject to their own discrete shareholder votes.
Unlike SOP, SOGP was not in the Senate version of Dodd-Frank until
the very end of the legislative process, when the House version
including the provision was adopted in conference without any notable
public discussion or congressional debate. The vote is advisory and may
be avoided entirely if the golden parachute was disclosed in conjunction
with an earlier SOP vote.62 However, few firms avail themselves of this
57. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n-1(a)(1) (2012). Section 951 of Dodd-Frank also requires firms to submit to a non-binding
shareholder vote on the frequency of the SOP vote, i.e., every one, two, or three years, with that
vote occurring no less frequently than once every six years. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(2). SOP subjects
the compensation of the executives named in the firm’s proxy statement to a shareholder vote.
58. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the
Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (noting SOP’s
adoption in Sweden); Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law
and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 226–36 (2008) (describing SOP’s adoption in the
United Kingdom and Australia); Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around
the World, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 653 (2015) (analyzing SOP legislation across the globe).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (requiring approval of all compensation disclosed pursuant to
Item 40 of Regulation S-K). As we will discuss later, the fact that the golden parachutes are also
subject to annual SOP votes could imply that, before the change-in-control actually takes place,
the company may be more hesitant in increasing (or promising very generous) golden parachutes
and is more likely to increase the payment immediately before the change-in-control takes place.
60. The advisory nature of the votes was even highlighted in the final version of the DoddFrank Act, which specified that any action or inaction by the board in response to the votes was
not grounds for a fiduciary-duty violation under state corporate law. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)(1)–
(3); Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76
Fed. Reg. 6010, 6011 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (“These shareholder
votes also do not ‘create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of
directors’ nor do they ‘create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of
directors.’ ” (footnotes omitted)).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1). To qualify as having been subject to a prior Say-on-Pay vote
(and thus exempt from the specific GP advisory vote requirement at a later date), firms must
disclose information required by Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K. For annual report purposes, on the
other hand, they need only provide information under Item 402(j). The two disclosures are similar,
thus one might have expected firms to disclose under 402(t) to receive the waiver from future Sayon-GP votes.
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preclearance option.63 It seems likely that firms view the downside of
waiting for an SOGP vote at the time of a deal as being relatively small
since the advisory nature of the vote and the final-period nature of most
GP-triggering transactions mean their directors are unlikely to face any
consequences.
In both cases, the legislative history is not clear on Congress’s
substantive goals regarding compensation levels or features. As a
witness before the House considering the provisions, Gene Sperling,
Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury, testified: “[W]e were not
coming with a particular legislative or even regulatory proposal. We
really were in a sense trying to shine a spotlight on a practice that we
think . . . that shareholders and management should reexamine.”64
Representative Frank himself observed, “It’s a question of empowering
the shareholders to decide the appropriate level because it’s their
money and giving regulators the ability to prevent compensation
incentives that encourage taking inappropriate and excessive risk.”65
Whether SOP or SOGP are deemed effective on their own terms,
therefore, appears to hinge on firms’ sensitivity to shareholder voice as
much as on reductions in overall GP promises or adjustment of
particular terms. We examine each of these in Part II.
1. The Advisory Vote Experience with Say on Pay
SOP and SOGP are not the first examples of direct shareholder
votes on executive compensation matters. For example, under stock
exchange rules, shareholders are required to pass equity compensation
63. See, e.g., Michael G. O’Bryan, David M. Lynn & Scott G. Hodgdon, New Golden Parachute
Compensation Disclosure and Shareholder Advisory Vote Requirements, MORRISON FORESTER 2
(June 3, 2011), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110603-SEC-Golden-ParachuteRequirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULY3-35NV]:
Based on the filings thus far this proxy season, it is unlikely that companies will often
use the Say-on-Pay vote exception. In the months since the requirement for a
mandatory Say-on-Pay vote became effective, only a handful of issuers have voluntarily
included the Item 402(t) golden parachute compensation disclosures in their annual
meeting proxy statements. Companies may be concerned with how these disclosures
could impact the required Say-on-Pay vote, including whether such disclosures would
be viewed favorably by proxy advisory services if the annual meeting proxies include
the additional golden parachute compensation disclosures. In addition, companies may
be concerned that providing such disclosures voluntarily signals the market that the
company could be engaged in a significant transaction in the coming months.
(footnote omitted).
64. Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. 27 (2009) (statement of Gene Sperling, Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury,
U.S. Department of the Treasury).
65. Press Release, Barney Frank, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Fin. Servs. (July 16,
2009),
https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
382736 [https://perma.cc/V3ZY-X9KU].
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plans pursuant to which firms distribute restricted stock and options.66
As discussed above, shareholder votes are able to cleanse “excess”
golden parachutes from being subject to tax penalties, at least in the
private company context.67 Recently repealed tax rules encouraged
firms to have shareholders approve bonus plans in order to qualify them
as deductible “performance-based” compensation.68 And, indirectly,
annual director elections have at times become referenda on executive
compensation matters.
Expanding these voting rights to include advisory SOP and
SOGP votes was attacked, on the one hand, as being weak medicine for
whatever ailed executive compensation. The earlier voting rights that
shareholders held had direct and certain consequences in the event of a
negative vote. If an equity plan, for instance, was voted down, then it
could not be used by exchange-listed companies to award options or
restricted stock. If a bonus plan was voted down, compensation paid
under it could not receive IRC 162(m)’s favorable “performance-based”
designation for tax purposes.69 And, of course, directors being voted out
via proxy contest would be an incredibly significant event. Because SOP
and SOGP were nonbinding, critics denounced them as little more than
a routinized set of votes on precatory proposals related to executive
compensation under the “town hall meeting” rule in the federal proxy
rules.70
On the other hand, some commentators worried that SOP and
SOGP, although advisory, represented an improper and potentially
consequential incursion by shareholders into the traditional
66. See, e.g., Christopher S. Armstrong, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, The Efficacy of
Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 909, 910 (2013);
Andrew C.W. Lund, What Was the Question? The NYSE and Nasdaq’s Curious Listing Standards
Requiring Shareholder Approval of Equity-Compensation Plans, 39 CONN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2006)
(discussing shareholder roles in determining compensation levels of executives at public
companies).
67. See supra note 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the Internal
Revenue Code on GP payments).
68. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012) (outlining deduction protocol for excessive employee
remuneration).
69. When the bonus or option plan is no longer considered “performance based,” for any such
compensation over $1 million per year, the company may no longer be able to treat them as an
expense so as to reduce the corporate-income tax burden. See id. This preference for performancebased compensation was eliminated in the recent tax bill revising the Internal Revenue Code.
Regina Olshan et al., Section 162(m) After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: What to Do Now, SKADDEN,
ARPS,
SLATE,
MEAGHER
&
FLOM
LLP
&
AFFILIATES
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/01/section-162m-after-the-tax-cuts-andjobs-act [https://perma.cc/3DFV-MSEU].
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2019). For more on shareholder proposals, see Jie Cai & Ralph
Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
299 (2011); and Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen Stubben, Board of Directors’
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2010).
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decisionmaking domain of directors. At best, SOP and SOGP would add
needless costs to the proxy process.71 Worse, boards might be directly or
indirectly influenced by shareholders who misunderstood the impact of
pay in setting executive incentives and attracting highly qualified
managers.72 Worst, proxy advisors—chiefly ISS—might come to
dominate shareholder votes and apply pernicious or unintelligible
standards to public company pay, including golden parachutes.73
Unsurprisingly given the heat of this debate, SOP has been the
subject of a fair amount of study by academics in law and finance as
well as advisory groups.74 Early studies of SOP voting found over 90%
“yes” votes overall.75 Over time, that support has continued. Only 1.4%–
2.8% of pay plans were voted down in any given year between 2011 and
2016.76 Depending on the threshold one adopts, substantial shareholder
opposition has occurred with respect to either 7.4%–8.8% of votes (30%
disapproval) or 23.5%–28.4% of votes (10% disapproval), neither of
which suggests large-scale shareholder dissatisfaction over pay
practices.77

71. See Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257, The Shareholder
Vote on Executive Compensation Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong.
App. at 120–47 (March 8, 2007) (prepared statement of Stephen N. Kaplan, Neubauer Family
Professor of Entrepeneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business)
(attesting to the unnecessary costs imposed by say-on-pay voting). Some suggested more
attenuated negative effects. See Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417 (2011) (observing that positive SOP results may enable
boards to deflect blame for compensation decisions).
72. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1815 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s executive compensation
provisions are inconsistent with the board-centric model of corporate governance); Thomas et al.,
supra note 7, at 1215 (asking “whether the . . . say-on-pay regime will change executive pay level
and practices, and more generally, the dialogue between management and shareholders on the
subject”).
73. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank, 2
ENGAGE J. 33, 33–34, (2010); Bainbridge, supra note 72; Gordon, supra note 5, at 326; A Call for
Change in the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo: The Case for Greater Accountability and
Oversight,
CTR.
EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
7–8
(Jan.
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5U8W-H4VY].
74. See, e.g., James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Sayon-Pay under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967
(2013).
75. Id. at 979–80 (finding that pay plans in the next year following SOP adoption experienced
91.2% support overall and that only 1.3% of firms experienced greater than 50% dissent).
76. See 2016 Say on Pay Results: End of Year Report, SEMLER BROSSY 1 (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2016-Year-End-Say-on-Pay-Report-0201-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/69WD-SHLU].
77. Id.
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These studies have also tended to show that ISS has not applied
a routinized, one-size-fits-all approach to SOP recommendations.78
Moreover, it appears that shareholders do not blindly follow ISS
recommendations when voting on SOP. The earliest studies found that
shareholders appeared to adjust ISS voting recommendations
downward (more dissent) in cases of poor firm performance and upward
(less dissent) in cases of excellent firm performance.79 Recent work
confirms that, while proxy advisor recommendations play an important
role, shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, appear to
base their voting decisions on many other factors, such as whether the
firm has produced a good return in the recent past (as measured by
either return on assets or abnormal return) and whether the total
executive pay seems very large (as measured by whether the total pay
is in the highest quartile among all publicly traded companies).80
Finally, contrary to predictions of SOP’s inconsequentiality,
studies have found that, on average, firms actively respond to negative
SOP recommendations and votes.81 Ertimur et al. (2013), for instance,
found that firms experiencing a negative recommendation or
substantial (but not majority) shareholder opposition reported changes
to pay practices in the subsequent year.82 Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
firms must disclose how they have responded to the previous year’s SOP
results in their subsequent proxies.83 Ertimur et al. (2013) showed that
when 30% or more of the shares vote against the compensation, more
than 70% of the firms respond by changing their pay practices in the
78. See Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 953 (“Contrary to critics’ concerns . . . we find limited
evidence of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. That is, in most cases, the presence of certain provisions
in the compensation plan does not automatically translate into negative recommendations.”).
79. See Cotter et al., supra note 74, at 986 (analyzing how total stock returns and ISS
recommendations correlate with shareholder votes); see also Ryan Krause, Kimberley A. Witler &
Matthew Semadeni, Power to the Principals! An Experimental Look at Shareholder Say-on-Pay
Voting, 57 ACAD. MGMT. J. 94 (2014) (discussing how shareholders care about firm performance
when exercising their SOP votes). Shareholders appeared to be better able to buck ISS “for”
recommendations in the face of countervailing information (regarding recent increases in CEO pay
or “excess” pay) than they were ISS “against” recommendations. That is, ISS “against”
recommendations seemed dispositive in ways that ISS “for” recommendations were not. Id. at 989.
80. Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch show, for instance, the better the company’s financial return
and the lower the CEO’s total pay, the less likely shareholders will vote against the executive pay.
Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 954. Fisch, Palia, and Solomon, using a more updated dataset, also
corroborate these findings. Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 121–23. Similar to Ertimur et al., Fisch et
al. show that the negative SOP votes are correlated with lower stock returns and lower return on
assets. Id. They also show a strong correlation between excess CEO pay (in terms of quartiles) and
firm returns (in terms of quartiles). Id. Most of these correlations survive the inclusion of a control
for ISS Against. See id. at 119–23 (finding that say on pay may actually be a say on performance).
81. See Cotter et al., supra note 74, at 1002–10 (presenting four case studies in which
company management actively responded to negative ISS reports).
82. Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 986.
83. See discussion supra note 11.
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subsequent year.84 Elsewhere, researchers found that boards reduced
CEO compensation in response to negative SOP votes.85 Interestingly,
other researchers found an ex ante effect of SOP, whereby boards
reduced CEO compensation and made it more performance based in
advance of SOP votes.86 Although other studies found SOP to be less
effective in shaping contracting practices,87 these findings suggest that
SOP, despite being advisory, may be able to influence incumbent boards
to make corporate governance changes under certain circumstances.
2. Advisory Votes on Golden Parachutes
Like SOP, SOGP provides for an advisory vote on executive
compensation and was adopted at the same time as SOP. These
similarities raise the question of whether what we are learning about
SOP can map onto the experience with SOGP. To this point, the only
research done on the SOGP process has been summary work by
advisory firms. From this work, we know that the results of SOGP votes
have generally been favorable. According to a Pearl Meyer white paper,
of the 699 GP votes held from implementation in 2011 through 2016,
70% resulted in high shareholder approval (80% approval or greater)
while majority negative votes were obtained in only 5% of cases.88
At the same time, a superficial look suggests that ISS is
becoming aggressive in its recommendations against GPs.89 ISS and
84. Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 985 fig.1.
85. Marinilka B. Kimbro & Danielle Xu, Shareholders Have a Say in Executive
Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States, 35 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 36
(2016) (“[E]ven when [the return on assets] increases, there is a reduction in excessive
compensation in firms with high SOP dissent.”).
86. See Steven Balsam, Jeff Boone, Harrison Liu & Jennifer Yin, The Impact of Say-on-Pay
on Executive Compensation, 35 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 162, 188 (2016) (“[F]irms modified their
compensation packages with an eye toward winning shareholder approval of their executive
compensation” ahead of SOP’s adoption).
87. See Kelly R. Brunarski, T. Colin Campbell & Yvette S. Harman, Evidence on the Outcome
of Say-On-Pay Votes: How Managers, Directors, and Shareholders Respond, 30 J. CORP. FIN. 132,
147 (2015) (“SOP legislation has not had the intended effect of improving CEO contracting, at least
in the short term.”).
88. Margaret Black & Daniel Wetzel, Updated: Say on Golden Parachute Votes, PEARL MEYER
2 (June 20, 2016), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/say-golden-parachute.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ6Q3RW9].
89. Margaret Black & Daniel Wetzel, Updated: Say on Golden Parachute Votes, PEARL MEYER
3 (Dec. 17, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20140429050745/http://www.pearlmeyer.com/Pearl/
media/PearlMeyer/ArticlesWhitepapers/PMP-ART-SOGPUpdate-12-17-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7QC-KPTK]:
These recent changes in its voting guidelines appear to be increasing the likelihood that
ISS will issue a negative voting recommendation on transaction pay proposals. In fact,
ISS seems to be doing so roughly twice as often as for Say on Pay proposals. Negative
voting recommendations were made for 35 of the 125 SOGP proposals (approximately
28%) brought before shareholders in meetings between February 1, 2013 and October
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other proxy advisory firms have maintained guidelines relating to GPs
for some time, even predating the SOGP regime.90 ISS’s 2016 Proxy
Voting Guidelines, which remain practically unchanged, recommend
voting “case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals” and
“consider[ing] . . . existing change-in-control arrangements maintained
with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or
extended arrangements.”91 ISS further calls out problematic features
that may lead to a negative recommendation without spelling out
precisely how the decision will be made:
Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance; [s]ingle-trigger acceleration of unvested
equity awards; [e]xcessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus); [e]xcise tax grossups triggered and payable (as opposed to a provision to provide excise tax gross-ups);
[e]xcessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of
transaction equity value); or [r]ecent amendments that incorporate any problematic
features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that
may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in
the best interests of shareholders . . . .92

The ISS guidelines conclude by noting that “[r]ecent
amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry
more weight on the overall analysis.”93 Other shareholder advisors and
institutional shareholders have begun to adopt similar guidelines.
Glass Lewis, ISS’s most significant competitor, has adopted guidelines
that are more opaque.94 Vanguard, similar to other institutional

31, 2013. In contrast, 20% of proposals received “Against” recommendations in voting
results filed through December 31, 2012, as reported in our March 2013 update.
90. This makes sense given the common belief that GPs were the subject of a large number
of shareholder proposals in earlier periods. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 140. In fact,
Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance reports categorized shareholder proposals relating to all
forms of severance as “Golden Parachute” proposals, artificially inflating the perceived levels of
shareholder dissatisfaction with GPs in particular. See, e.g., 2008 Annual Corporate Governance
Review, GEORGESON 32 (2008), https://www.georgeson.com/us/Documents/acgr/acgr2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4YN-JGLH] (describing Boeing shareholder proposal as one to approve/vote on
future GPs); see also The Boeing Company, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14a), Item 9 (Mar. 14,
2008),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312508057498/ddef14a.htm#
toc96257_38 [https://perma.cc/J7NG-L4PM] (describing Boeing shareholder proposal to require
shareholder approval of certain future severance agreements).
91. United States Summary Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2016 Benchmark Policy
Recommendations,
INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER
SERVS.
42
(2016),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2016-us-summary-voting-guidelines-23-feb-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L9C4-NB7F]. ISS explicitly called out such features beginning in 2013 about a
year and a half after SOGP votes were actually underway.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id.
94. Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice: United States,
GLASS
LEWIS
33
(2019),
https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
Guidelines_US.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MG7-SN3M]
(stating
that
“[e]gregious
or
excessive . . . severance payments, including . . . golden parachutes” is a factor that militates in
favor of a negative recommendation on an SOP vote).
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investors, has explicitly accepted that GPs may be appropriate in most
contexts, subject to restraints on specific features.95
Yet, to our knowledge, no one has attempted a full treatment of
SOGP. Partially, the failure to study SOGP may stem from an
assumption that SOGP plays a negligible role, if any, in compensation
or deal planning. On the other hand, it may partly stem from a lack of
available data. Information about proxy advisor recommendations and
shareholder votes is available, as is information about projected GP
payout amounts that is required to be disclosed each year by public
companies.96 But there is no database that aggregates final GP
promises as disclosed in the merger proxy leading to the SOGP vote,
which is ultimately the information on which proxy advisors and
shareholders are basing their decisions and which may deviate
substantially from the previously disclosed GP projections due to
contract amendments, increases in equity values, or salary and bonus
increases, among other things. Our hand collection of golden parachute
data from merger proxies solves this problem.
How similar to SOP is SOGP in theory? Despite their obvious
similarities, there is reason to think the two voting regimes are apt to
have different results. Under SOP, directors who fail to react to proxy
advisors or shareholder pressure face plausible consequences, up to and
including shareholder backlash in the next director election. SOGP, on
the other hand, takes place only in the context of takeovers where the
directors experiencing dissent are unlikely to be standing for reelection
in the coming years, and, even if they are continuing as directors in the
new entity, they will be subject to votes from a much different
shareholder group in ensuing years. As such, they are subject only to
reputation costs in the director labor market, which may not be strong
enough to compel action.
Furthermore, SOP puts bargaining pressure on executives.
Sometimes, executives may be willing to amend their existing
compensation arrangements in order to placate shareholders because
they anticipate future interactions as they continue as executives.
Other times, the directors are unilaterally choosing to grant equity
awards, pay bonuses, or raise salaries. In either case, executives are not
in a particularly strong position to force pay decisions that might
antagonize shareholders. CEOs holding golden parachutes are in
95. Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Portfolio Companies, VANGUARD FUNDS 13 (2019),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-company-resources/proxy_voting_
guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQR-729R] (“A fund will vote for proposals to approve golden
parachutes unless they are excessive or unreasonable (e.g., severance payments total more than
three times salary plus bonus, are ‘single trigger,’ or include excise tax gross-ups.”)).
96. See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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another situation entirely. They are likely to be terminating their
relationship with the firm as part of the merger and may therefore be
less willing to renegotiate existing golden parachutes to appease proxy
advisors or shareholders.
This leaves open the possibility that initial golden parachute
terms might be negotiated in the shadow of future SOGP votes. On the
other hand, a golden parachute promise with no takeover in the offing
may not prove salient enough to shareholders to generate enough
outrage. In any event, a golden parachute promise with no takeover in
the offing that does generate shareholder outrage is necessarily going
to be subject to shareholder dissent via the annual SOP vote rather than
an SOGP vote that does not need to be held until a takeover occurs.
Thus, SOGP may be less effective than other corporate governance tools
(including SOP specifically) in shaping compensation decisions.
II. EMPIRICAL TESTS
In this Part, we empirically examine the experience with SOGP
since its adoption under the Dodd-Frank Act. The most pertinent
questions are whether the SOGP regime has had an effect on proxy
advisors’ recommendations and shareholders’ voting behavior, and
whether SOGP has had an overall effect on golden parachute
contracting. If SOGP had, or was perceived to have had, no disciplinary
effect, we would expect a number of things. First, golden parachute
incidence and dollar values would have been unaffected by SOGP’s
adoption. Target firms would not adjust golden parachutes downward
in the face of actual or potential negative SOGP recommendations or
votes. We would also expect to see certain phenomena with respect to
the voting process itself. Proxy advisors might economize by using
simple, one-size-fits-all criteria when making their recommendations if
their clients were expected to care less about the vote. Further, SOGP
voters might simply adopt whatever proxy advisor recommendations
they receive if it is obvious to them that it is not wise to expend their
own resources to sort through the merits of the decision.
A. Data Collection and Sample Description
Our empirical study utilizes four different data sources: (1) ISS
voting data which show the results of SOGP votes; (2) CRSP-Compustat
data that include various company financial and nonfinancial
characteristics, such as Book Value of Assets, Return on Assets
(“ROA”), and Market Value of Equity (“MVE”); (3) the Execucomp
dataset, from which we get information on executives that receive
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golden parachute payments, including CEO salary, bonus, and
projected golden parachute payments (the summed amount including
unobservable amounts of potential cash payments and accelerated
equity vesting); and (4) a novel, hand-collected dataset (pulled from the
companies’ merger proxies and S-4 registration statements) on final
golden parachute payments that have been subjected to SOGP votes.
We discuss this in more detail below.
First, we use the ISS Company Vote Results database to find all
SOGP votes at Russell 3000 firms from 2011 to 2017 related to GPs and
find 803 observations. We then merge those firms with the CRSPCompustat sample for annual financial data by fiscal year and firmidentifying information, yielding 647 observations through June 2017.
After removing cases triggering an SOGP vote but not actually
involving a golden parachute (usually instances of an excise tax
reimbursement pursuant to Section 4985 of the IRC), we have 631
observations. We call this the “Russell 3000 Sample.” Consistent with
earlier empirical studies on SOP, we merge these firms with Execucomp
for compensation information as well as insider characteristics such as
CEO age, tenure, and ownership. Execucomp does not track many of
the firms in the ISS SOGP vote database, leaving us with 263 firms
with complete information. We call this subset of the Russell 3000
Sample the “Execucomp Sample.”
In addition, instead of relying solely on commercially available
data, we have also hand collected and coded each proxy statement
preceding an SOGP vote for firms in the Russell 3000 Sample. Those
proxies come in the form of either a definitive merger proxy or an S-4
filed by an acquiring company in a stock-for-stock deal. Both of these
documents require information described in Item 502(t) of Regulation
S-K, which calls for tabular disclosure of potential GP payments broken
out into categories: cash, equity, and perquisites/other. We collected
data regarding the final potential GP payments disclosed in the proxy,
breaking amounts into cash (salary and bonus), equity, perquisites
(“other” excluding tax gross-ups and pension plan accelerations), and
the total (all amounts including tax gross-ups and pension plan
accelerations). Firms are not required to disclose bona fide posttransaction employment agreements between (1) named executive
officers of the target and (2) the acquirer.97 This potentially subjects our
hand coding to a serious undercounting problem to the extent acquirers
transform current GPs into post-transaction employment contracts
with severance protections. In fact, however, targets very often describe
97. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation,
76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6027 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
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such arrangements either directly (in which case we include such
potential payments in our GP data) or with a statement that no such
arrangements have been entered into between the parties.98
This provides two advantages. First, our data are able to break
down the components of golden parachutes rather than simply
observing the total as Execucomp does. This is important to the extent
that certain features of golden parachutes are handled differently by
proxy advisors or shareholders than others. Second, we observe closerto-actualized golden parachute obligations than those disclosed in
earlier annual proxy statements. The amounts we find via hand coding
remain hypothetical to the extent they are double triggers and rely on
a future termination. But the commercially available data commonly
used in academic studies provides a snapshot of golden parachutes from
a much earlier date, which necessarily cannot account for late
amendments or increases in golden parachutes’ equity value brought on
by any deal premium. Most obviously, it is these data and not ones from
earlier periods that proxy advisors and shareholders are examining
when they are making their SOGP decisions.
TABLE 1: GOLDEN PARACHUTE SIZES AND INCIDENCE BY YEAR

Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Number of
Number CEOs with
of CEOs
GPs
1,895
1,084
2,237
1,680
2,160
1,660
2,122
1,687
2,095
1,712
2,057
1,660
2,019
1,608
1,978
1,587
1,941
1,598
1,858
1,513
1,753
1,442
76
67

Average
Median
GP
GP
($ 1,000s) ($ 1,000s)
11,503.27
4,576.26
11,167.63
4,744.50
8,907.90
4,270.73
10,721.46
5,472.06
12,791.29
6,690.08
11,834.42
6,373.80
12,496.98
6,827.52
14,858.91
8,186.56
15,881.52
8,976.26
14,290.72
8,347.68
15,780.63 10,081.44
16,139.96 11,435.87

Average
Ratio of
GP to
Salary
13.08
13.08
10.14
12.53
14.49
13.25
13.66
15.73
16.56
14.57
16.30
17.27

Median
Ratio of
GP to
Salary
7.58
8.22
6.80
8.78
10.30
9.49
9.64
11.44
12.26
10.92
12.86
15.08

We begin by observing golden parachute incidence and dollar
values during the period preceding SOGP’s adoption through the
present across all Execucomp firms whether or not they experience a

98. This transparency is somewhat puzzling but may be explained by the requirement in
Items 5(a) and 5(b)(xii) of Schedule 14A to disclose such agreements if they constitute a
“substantial interest” in the business combination. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2019).
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change-in-control event. Table 1 presents this data in an easy-to-read
format. Firms with golden parachutes ranged from 75.1% (2007) to
82.3% (2014 and 2016). Only 57.2% of firms reported golden parachutes
in 2006, though that number is so far from subsequent years, we believe
it likely represents an error in reporting either by firms or Execucomp
in the first year following the adoption of new compensation disclosure
rules. These data show that firms adopted golden parachutes regardless
of whether a change-in-control event was apt to occur as part of a
standard CEO employment agreement. Average and median golden
parachutes were generally increasing throughout the period. The
average golden parachute was over $11 million in 2007, dipped to under
$9 million in 2008,99 and steadily rose to over $15 million. Median
amounts reflected a similar trajectory. We return to this data below to
examine the effect of SOGP’s introduction in 2011.
TABLE 2: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOGP FIRMS
Mean

Median

Observations

4,349.49

1,137.30

631

ln(MVE) (millions)

6.41

6.33

631

ROA

0.06

0.08

631

Abnormal Returns

0.00

-0.02

631

Insider Holdings

5.36

1.11

631

Book assets (millions)

Institutional Holdings

69.13

78.27

631

Deal Premium

1.28

1.20

631

CEO Total Compensation (millions)

7.16

4.64

263

16.44

11.53

263

CEO Golden Parachute (GP) (millions)
CEO Salary + Bonus (millions)

1.04

0.90

263

16.99

13.29

262

CEO Tenure

8.48

7.00

263

All CEO Total Compensation (millions)

5.34

2.08

48,240

12.67

6.59

21,895

Ratio of CEO GP to Salary

All CEO Golden Parachute (GP) (millions)

When we narrow our focus to firms experiencing an SOGP vote
(as shown in Table 2 except for the final two rows), we see that the
median annual compensation in the year of a golden parachute event
for CEOs from the Execucomp Sample was $4.64 million ($7.16 million
average) as compared with $2.08 million ($5.34 million average) in the
99. We suspect this dip is driven by the drop in GP equity value during the financial crisis.
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Execucomp database more generally.100 The median preexisting GP
obligation to a CEO experiencing a golden parachute event was $11.53
million ($16.44 million average) compared to $6.59 million ($12.67
million average) in the overall Execucomp database. This results in an
average golden-parachute-to-compensation ratio of 2.48 for the fiscal
year prior to an SOGP vote.101 With our hand-coded data we are able to
compare predicted golden parachutes from the prior fiscal year to final
golden parachutes at the time of the deal. We find a median Final GP
of $13.11 million ($19.22 million average), or a 13.7% (16.9%) increase
between the prior fiscal year and the period immediately preceding the
SOGP vote. Execucomp does not separate the components of a golden
parachute in its data, so we are unable to determine which parts of
golden parachutes might be driving this last-period increase. It is likely
the case that the value of golden parachute equity increased during that
period, assuming the amount of unvested equity stayed relatively
constant (i.e., the executive did not cash out more than he received), as
the takeover will usually occasion a jump in equity value. It may also
be the case that executives were able to negotiate for extra
compensation during this period,102 a potentiality that we address in
Table 7 below.
B. Proxy Advisors
Our first empirical examination attempts to answer whether
and how recommendations issued by ISS, by far the most important
proxy advisory firm,103 correlate with various characteristics of golden
parachutes, executives, firms, and the takeover deal. Tables 3 and 4
tabulate information regarding the SOGP votes in our Russell 3000
Sample by year.

100. We look to the fiscal year of the shareholder vote on SOGP and match that with the fiscal
year compensation information in the Execucomp database. When Execucomp drops the firm in
that fiscal year because of the takeover, we use the prior fiscal year’s compensation information
from Execucomp.
101. Note that this number is substantially below the GP/Salary ratios shown in Table 1. This
is primarily because the denominator in the implied ratio from Table 2 is total annual
compensation as opposed to salary only in Table 1.
102. See Broughman, supra note 37, at 90–91 (discussing the possibility that CEOs “can
use . . . holdup power to bargain for personal benefits”).
103. See Choi et al., supra note 9, for a more detailed discussion on proxy advisory firms and
the perceived influence of ISS.

250

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:223

TABLE 3: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION—PROXY ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Average % of
Shares
SOGP Outstanding
Events
Voted For
37
81
120
99
123
135
36

0.62
0.57
0.59
0.61
0.59
0.63
0.60

# ISS
Average % of
Recommendations
Shares
Outstanding
Voted Against For
Against
0.09
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.15
0.13
0.17

32
64
84
71
88
100
21

4
17
35
26
32
35
15

From Table 3, we see an overall recommendation rate of 72.9%
by ISS for SOGP proposals. The table shows variation in ISS
recommendations across time. There is a noticeably small rate of
negative recommendations in 2011 and a noticeably large rate of
negative recommendations in the first part of 2017. Although the
reasons behind this difference require more detailed empirical analysis,
we suspect that it stems from the general downturn or up-turn in the
stock market, which, in turn, affects the size of the golden parachute,
especially through the stock- and option-vesting provisions.
Table 4 shows that although the ISS recommendations on golden
parachutes are correlated with the recommendations on the mergers,
there is some divergence. Foremost, out of 626 mergers that were
subject to shareholder approval, ISS recommended “for” the merger in
611 cases: the rate of recommendation in favor of the merger is about
97.6%, which raises the specter that ISS is more or less “rubberstamping” the merger proposals. At the same time, however, out of the
626 golden parachute proposals, ISS was recommending “against” in
159 cases, which is a negative recommendation rate of about 25.4%.
Unlike its recommendations on mergers, there seems to be a
significantly higher variation with respect to ISS’s recommendations on
golden parachutes. If we were to take a closer look at splitrecommendation cases, out of 611 cases where ISS recommended “for”
votes on mergers, in 159 cases (about 26%), ISS’s recommendation on
SOGP was “against.” Somewhat interestingly, out of the eleven cases
where ISS recommended against the merger, in seven cases, they also
recommended that the shareholders approve the golden parachute
payments. The number of observations in Table 4 is reduced by 5
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because in those cases we were unable to find ISS’s recommendation on
the merger.
TABLE 4: CORRELATION IN PROXY ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS
ISS SOGP Recommendation
Against
Do Not Vote
For
ISS Merger
Recommendation

Total

Against
Do Not Vote
For

3
0
159

1
2
4

7
2
448

11
4
611

Total

162

7

457

626

Consistent with the findings of Ertimur et al. (2013) with respect
to SOP, we expect to find a positive relationship between ISS “against”
SOGP recommendations and both high golden parachute amounts as
well as poor firm performance.104 To get a better understanding of how
ISS’s recommendations are related to various measures, we estimate a
logistic regression where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable equal to one if ISS recommends “against.” ISS specifically calls
out problematic GP features that may lead to a negative
recommendation: (1) single-trigger payouts or equity vesting even if the
executive is not fired; (2) tax gross-ups; (3) high levels of cash severance
relative to previous salary and bonus; and (4) “excessive” parachutes
generally.105 ISS also notes that recent amendments may be weighted
more heavily. The single- or double-trigger nature of golden parachutes
is difficult to capture in our data. Some (but not a majority) of
companies break out single- and double-trigger payouts in their merger
proxies. We are, however, able to identify firms that promise tax grossups and also to construct indicator variables (1) where final golden
parachute cash amounts are greater than three times the prior year’s
cash compensation according to Execucomp, and (2) where CEOs
experienced a golden parachute amendment during the year preceding
the announcement of the merger.106

104. See Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 966.
105. See discussion supra note 92 and accompanying text.
106. We are able to observe amendments by reviewing public filings, generally 8-Ks, that call
out Item 5.02 of Regulation S-K (Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors;
Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers), 10-Qs and 10Ks containing amendments as exhibits, and 8-Ks disclosing the merger where amendments to a
GP are discussed. We do not capture ordinary course salary, bonus increases, or equity grants, all
of which will affect GP amounts. Nor are we able to capture changes to terms of equity plans or
merger provisions, both of which might call for different vesting provisions for unvested equity.
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As noted, we predict that ISS’s SOGP recommendations will be
significantly related to compensation concerns. We therefore include
the final value disclosed for the CEO GP contract at the time of the
shareholder vote and CEO Total Compensation to control for possible
excessive compensation as well as indicators for Prior SOP Vote and
Prior Compensation Activism to control for general dissatisfaction that
may exist with pay arrangements at a firm. SOGP votes happen
simultaneously with shareholder votes on the underlying deal, and it is
possible that an SOGP recommendation might be influenced by ISS’s
positive or negative view of the overall deal. Therefore, we also control
for Deal Premium measured as the stock price one business day after
the announced merger divided by the stock price twenty business days
before the announcement. We include an indicator, ISS Against Merger,
equal to one if ISS recommended against the merger.107 As measures of
performance, we include Abnormal Returns and ROA. We include these
variables because proxy advisors (and their shareholder clients) may be
more willing to agree to high GPs in the face of recent good performance
by management as something of a parting gift common in the relational
contracting literature.108 Finally, we also control for size and ownership
structure.
Table 5 presents our results. Final golden parachute amounts
are significantly correlated with ISS “against” recommendations. We
also find a significant positive relationship between ISS “against”
recommendations and firms with golden parachutes in the highest
quartile. This suggests that ISS applies its “excessive golden parachute”
criteria based not only on the absolute size of the golden parachute but
also on a relative basis. Firm performance seems to have an uncertain
relation to ISS recommendations, with ROA quartiles exhibiting the
expected sign but not showing statistical significance. We find some
evidence that higher deal premiums may cause ISS to recommend
“against” less frequently. ISS claims that recent amendments to golden
parachutes may be weighted more heavily in its analysis, but we find
no significant relationship between recent amendments and ISS
“against” recommendations.
In the context of Say-on-Pay votes, Ertimur et al. (2013) found
by reviewing ISS recommendation reports that tax gross-up provisions
Thus, our GP Amendment variable necessarily undercounts the number of cases in which the
terms of a GP have changed during the run-up to a deal.
107. We found “against” merger recommendations for eleven deals, or less than 2% of the
sample. In those cases, ISS recommended voting in favor of the GP in seven cases and against the
GP in three cases.
108. See, e.g., Baker & Choi, Contract’s Role, supra note 25; Baker & Choi, Reputation and
Litigation, supra note 25.
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in golden parachutes were the only feature that suggested ISS adopts a
one-size-fits-all approach to those SOP votes.109 With respect to SOGP
recommendations, we unsurprisingly find strong evidence that 280G
gross-up provisions are significantly related to ISS “against”
recommendations.110 Combined with the earlier discussed relationship
between “against” recommendations and highest quartile golden
parachutes, there appears to be more evidence of a one-size-fits-all
approach to SOGP votes, albeit one that is consistent with the SOP
experience.111
TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF PROXY ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS
(1)
CEO Golden Parachute

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.039***
(0.002)

Q1 CEO Golden Parachute
(Smallest Quartile)
Q4 CEO Golden Parachute
(Largest Quartile)
Q1 ROA (Worst Quartile)
Q4 ROA (Best Quartile)
Q1 Abnormal Returns
(Worst Quartile)
Q4 Abnormal Returns
(Best Quartile)
Low Abnormal Returns and
Large Golden Parachute
Low ROA and Large Golden
Parachute
ROA
-1.151
(0.490)
Abnormal Returns
-0.533
(0.347)
-0.213
GP Cash > 3 X (Salary +

-0.293
(0.518)
0.825**
(0.045)
0.205
(0.583)
-0.516
(0.195)
0.610
(0.101)
-0.093
(0.813)

-0.180

-0.296
(0.507)
0.838**
(0.040)
0.193
(0.604)
-0.518
(0.192)
0.608
(0.102)
-0.119
(0.759)
0.164
(0.842)
0.713
(0.117)
-1.782
(0.274)
-0.372
(0.517)
0.053

-2.107
(0.188)
-0.412
(0.445)
0.234

-0.147

0.162
(0.844)
0.727
(0.104)
-1.769
(0.274)
-0.380
(0.506)
0.092

109. Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 968.
110. However, we find no evidence that excessive cash payments drive ISS recommendations.
111. We are not able to capture at least one of the factors that, according to ISS, determines
its recommendation—single versus double triggers—which may complicate our data or tend to
show another “automatic” against feature. Another variable that does seem to affect the ISS’s
negative recommendation is the amount of institutional holdings: the larger the institutional
holdings, the more likely that ISS will recommend against the SOGP. We are not entirely sure
what drives this result, but one possible explanation relates to the fact that ISS’s clients are
institutional shareholders. When a firm’s shares are mainly owned by institutions (compared to
firms where institutional holdings are low), it is likely that ISS will conduct a more thorough
examination of the golden parachutes and make a negative recommendation—rather than rubberstamping the proposed payment.

254
Bonus) & Recent
Amendment
Tax Gross-Up

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
(0.714)

(0.763)

(0.925)

(0.673)

1.513*** 1.650*** 1.623*** 1.706***
(0.000)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Total Compensation
-0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.690)
(0.688) (0.659)
ln(MVE)
-0.321** -0.246
-0.188
-0.051
(0.046)
(0.122) (0.212) (0.682)
CEO Tenure
0.015
0.011
0.010
(0.525)
(0.653) (0.664)
Prior SOP Vote
0.029
0.015
0.178
0.329
(0.967)
(0.982) (0.796) (0.629)
Prior Compensation
0.455
1.051
0.865
1.371
Activism
(0.716)
(0.384) (0.477) (0.241)
Insider Holdings
-0.001
-0.002
-0.001
0.003
(0.974)
(0.907) (0.954) (0.885)
Institutional Holdings
0.019*
0.019** 0.021** 0.022**
(0.057)
(0.046) (0.028) (0.025)
ISS Against Merger
-0.398
-0.307
-0.409
-0.697
(0.817)
(0.854) (0.802) (0.679)
Deal Premium
-1.392
-1.401* -1.190
-1.049
(0.100)
(0.088) (0.146) (0.183)
Recent Amendment
0.744
0.673
0.498
0.381
(0.198)
(0.252) (0.377) (0.494)
Constant
-2.077
-1.960
-2.704
-3.601*
(0.364)
(0.387) (0.218) (0.085)
Year Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
263
263
263
263
Chi-square
60.107
57.014 52.803 48.763
Prob < Chi-square
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pseudo R2
0.182
0.172
0.160
0.147
P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05.
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(0.803)

(0.870)

1.641*** 1.613***
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.227
(0.138)

-0.166
(0.240)

0.029
(0.967)
1.159
(0.325)
-0.002
(0.939)
0.019**
(0.046)
-0.337
(0.837)
-1.402*
(0.086)
0.642
(0.269)
-1.942
(0.387)
Yes
263
56.629
0.000
0.171

0.187
(0.787)
0.992
(0.400)
-0.001
(0.977)
0.021**
(0.028)
-0.449
(0.782)
-1.196
(0.141)
0.462
(0.408)
-2.707
(0.211)
Yes
263
52.405
0.000
0.158

C. Shareholder Voting
We next turn to shareholder voting on SOGP itself. Average
shareholder SOGP dissent was 9.4% in 2011 and peaked at 17.1% in
the limited sample from 2017. During the five years in between, SOGP
dissent remained relatively constant at approximately 13%. In
untabulated results, firms experienced dissent greater than 40% in
14.4% of SOGP votes and dissent greater than 20% in 32.2% of such
votes.112 Although average dissent is well below 50% and there are
relatively few instances of threshold-breaching dissent at particular
firms, these levels of dissent are considerably higher than those in SOP
votes described above.

112. In the smaller Execucomp Sample, we see higher levels of dissent: 20.7% of firms
experience greater than 40% dissent and 39.6% of firms experience greater than 20% dissent.
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Similar to proxy advisor recommendations, we estimate an OLS
regression with the percent of overall shareholder votes that dissent as
the dependent variable. Again, we control for the final value disclosed
for the CEO GP contract at the time of the shareholder vote, with CEO
Total Compensation, Prior SOP Vote, and Prior Compensation Activism
as compensation-related factors that might affect shareholder voting.
Additionally, we continue to control for Deal Premium, firm
performance, firm size, and ownership structure. We include indicator
variables for ISS Against Merger and ISS Against GP
recommendations.
Table 6 shows, unsurprisingly, that ISS “against”
recommendations are strongly correlated with shareholder dissent. In
untabulated results, our 66.5% R-square result drops to approximately
10% when we drop the ISS Against variable.113 Moreover, ISS Against
appears to be economically significant. On average, after controlling for
all the other variables, the percent of dissenting votes is 32.4% higher
if ISS offers a negative recommendation. Once we take into account
ISS’s recommendations, the effect of tax gross-ups in GPs on
shareholder negative votes disappears and, in one specification, turns
significant (at the 10% level) and negative, suggesting that shareholders
care less about gross-ups than does ISS. Also, to the extent that ISS’s
recommendations seem closely related with Deal Premium, the effect of
the deal premium also loses its statistical significance in shareholder
votes. Perhaps most interesting are variables that become significant,
even when controlling for ISS “against” recommendations. The amount
of the golden parachute is significantly and positively related to
shareholder dissent, albeit at a level that may be economically
insignificant. These findings suggest that shareholders may attempt to
discipline CEOs with high golden parachutes more than ISS would
otherwise recommend. Further, shareholders appear to give highperforming executives a pass regardless of what ISS recommends.

113. It is possible that these findings are subject to omitted variable bias as we are not able to
capture single-trigger provisions in our data. Shareholders may be responding to these provisions
and not to ISS recommendations and we are not able to tease those stories apart.
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TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDER VOTES

ISS Against
CEO Golden Parachute

(1)

(2)

0.324***
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.025)

0.328***
(0.000)

Q1 CEO Golden Parachute
(Smallest Quartile)
Q4 CEO Golden Parachute
(Largest Quartile)
Q1 ROA (Worst Quartile)

(3)
0.332***
(0.000)

(4)
0.332***
(0.000)

-0.009
(0.680)
0.007
(0.725)
-0.021
(0.266)
-0.047**
(0.015)
0.009
(0.647)
-0.005
(0.785)

Q4 ROA (Best Quartile)
Q1 Abnormal Returns
(Worst Quartile)
Q4 Abnormal Returns
(Best Quartile)
Low Abnormal Returns
and Large Golden
Parachute
Low ROA and Large
Golden Parachute

(5)

(6)

0.328*** 0.331***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.010
(0.640)
0.009
(0.673)
-0.020
(0.274)
-0.046**
(0.017)
0.008
(0.654)
-0.003
(0.875)

-0.032

-0.033

(0.468)

(0.450)

0.014
(0.551)
-0.045
(0.586)
-0.002
(0.942)
-0.028
(0.131)
0.000
(0.886)
-0.006
(0.405)
-0.001
(0.366)
0.019
(0.580)

-0.052
(0.517)
0.004
(0.875)
-0.027
(0.138)

-0.029
(0.119)

0.015
(0.496)
-0.042
(0.605)
-0.001
(0.971)
-0.029
(0.120)

-0.004
(0.541)

-0.007
(0.306)

-0.005
(0.419)

0.020
(0.568)

0.014
(0.696)

0.017
(0.627)

-0.021
0.020
-0.005
0.006
0.021
(0.736)
(0.760)
(0.935)
(0.919)
(0.735)
Insider Holdings
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
(0.295)
(0.387)
(0.358)
(0.311)
(0.374)
Institutional Holdings
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.000
(0.841)
(0.993)
(0.910)
(0.951)
(0.988)
ISS Against Merger
0.023
0.024
0.016
0.014
0.025
(0.741)
(0.724)
(0.818)
(0.835)
(0.719)
Deal Premium
0.000
0.016
0.012
0.013
0.016
(0.989)
(0.623)
(0.698)
(0.675)
(0.616)
Constant
0.194**
0.174*
0.145
0.121
0.161*
(0.037)
(0.071)
(0.117)
(0.165)
(0.091)
Year controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
254
254
254
254
254
R-square
0.665
0.666
0.658
0.656
0.665
P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05

-0.003
(0.958)
-0.001
(0.349)
0.000
(0.918)
0.017
(0.810)
0.013
(0.687)
0.132
(0.143)
Yes
254
0.657

ROA
Abnormal Returns
Tax Gross-Up
CEO Total Compensation
ln(MVE)
CEO Tenure
Prior SOP Vote
Prior Compensation
Activism

-0.024
(0.768)
0.001
(0.965)
-0.035*
(0.060)
-0.000
(0.637)
-0.012*
(0.093)
-0.001
(0.407)
0.014
(0.675)

-0.028
(0.131)
0.000
(0.905)
-0.008
(0.298)
-0.001
(0.301)
0.016
(0.645)
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D. Changes in Golden Parachutes over Time and Golden Parachute
Amendments
As discussed earlier, SOGP may be materially different from
SOP, most notably because there is no second stage opportunity to
discipline directors or executives who fail to respond to SOGP concerns
or dissent. This suggests that the SOGP vote rule and individual SOGP
votes could have relatively little (or no) impact on golden parachute
practices. To determine whether SOGP has had an effect on golden
parachutes, we first look to see whether firms adjusted their golden
parachute practices upon the advent of SOGP. If SOGP was able to
effectively harness shareholder outrage, particularly in controlling the
size of golden parachutes, we should see reductions in golden parachute
dollar values, incidence, or both. If SOGP was inconsequential, we
would see no trend in particular.
FIGURE 1: GOLDEN PARACHUTE VALUES AND RATIOS BY YEAR

In fact, Figure 1 graphically represents how golden parachutes
have evolved over the past ten years or so. Solid and long-dashed lines
(at the top and at the bottom) plot the average (mean) and median sizes
of golden parachutes, respectively, and they are subject to the scale at
the left margin, where the unit of measurement is $2,000. Two shortdashed lines (in the middle of the figure), subject to the scale at the
right margin, plot average (mean) and median ratios of golden
parachutes to annual salary. Even without any systematic analysis, the
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figure shows that all lines seem to be growing over time and there seems
to be no discernable slowdown after Dodd-Frank—that is, after July
2010.
Turning to a more systematic analysis, Table 7 reports the
regression coefficients and shows that golden parachutes (in terms of
their absolute size) are systematically larger after 2010. Columns 1 and
2 in Table 7 use golden parachute value as the dependent variable.
Columns 3 and 4 use the ratio of golden parachute value to total CEO
compensation as the dependent variable. The strong results in columns
1 and 2 show that the values of golden parachutes increased following
SOGP.114 The weaker results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that this
increase may have occurred at the same time as overall CEO
compensation increased. Our results control for year effects, industry
effects, firm size, firm performance, CEO compensation, and CEO
tenure.115 We also control for the small subset of firms without golden
parachutes in 2006 and 2007 to ensure our inference is not being driven
by late golden parachute adoptions.
It is difficult to estimate the precise point in time when SOGP
became a likely requirement, as the change was introduced into DoddFrank legislation in 2009 and final rules were promulgated in 2011. For
robustness, we confirm in untabulated results that our results are not
sensitive to whether the “post” period is defined as post-2010 or post2011. In additional, untabulated robustness tests, we confirm that our
results are not sensitive to controlling for firm size using book assets
(as shown in the table) or using market values.

114. When we focus only on the top 10% (in terms of absolute size) of the golden parachutes,
the results are even more robust.
115. Our results are not sensitive to whether the model is estimated as a fixed-effect model, a
random-effect model, or as a pooled-OLS model.
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TABLE 7: GOLDEN PARACHUTE INCIDENCE AND VALUES PRE- AND POSTSOGP RULE116
(1)
Post
(Indicator for Years 2011–2017)
ln(Book Assets)

(2)

(3)

4.686***
3.813**
0.320
(0.005)
(0.021)
(0.159)
3.671***
4.273*** 0.106***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
CEO Tenure
0.168***
0.191*** -0.012**
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.013)
ROA
20.733*** 12.751*** -0.301
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.331)
CEO Total Compensation
0.069
0.061
-0.006
(0.287)
(0.301)
(0.204)
Indicator for Firm Having GP in
7.979***
7.630*** 1.641***
2006 or 2007
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Constant
-27.720*** -32.990***
0.427**
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.017)
Industry Controls
No
Yes
No
Year Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
20,652
20,613
20,602
R-square
0.181
0.219
0.086
P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05.

(4)
0.341
(0.129)
0.099***
(0.000)
-0.011**
(0.016)
-0.155
(0.621)
-0.006
(0.211)
1.595***
(0.000)
0.508
(0.545)
Yes
Yes
20,563
0.100

Finally, it is possible that SOGP was effective in shaping golden
parachute practices, but not in the initial contract. SOGP only occurs in
the context of a soon-to-close deal, offering firms and CEOs the ability
to wait until a deal is closed to amend the golden parachute downward
in the face of an imminent SOGP vote. The golden parachute
information has to be disclosed in part in annual proxy statements, but,
given that annual proxy statements contain lots of other information,
golden parachute-related information may well be dominated by other
compensation information when the deal is not expected in the near
future. Nevertheless, to the extent that disclosing very generous golden
parachute payments in the SOP process could subject the directors and

116. In the current setup, as the table indicates, we have included both year dummies and a
separate dummy (indicator) variable (as seen on the first row), which distinguishes between the
pre- and post-SOGP period. The advantage of using both types of indicator variables is that, while
the year dummies will control for the annual fluctuations in golden parachutes, pre- and postdummy will pick up the difference that stems from the change in law. For the results reported in
Table 7, indicators for both years 2006 and 2017 were not included as controls to avoid collinearity
issues. To ensure our inference is not dependent on this modeling assumption, we corroborate our
inferences using a few other untabulated specifications: (1) with only the pre- and post-2010
dummy without specific year controls and (2) with only the year dummies. It turns out that the
substantive results are the same. In fact, with only the year dummies, the joint significance (on
the coefficient estimates for the years after 2010 or after 2011) is significant at the 1% level and
all the year coefficients are positive, corroborating our inference from the results in Table 7.
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executives to future disciplinary forces, one would suspect that, given
the absence of such forces in the SOGP votes, the managers are more
likely to amend golden parachutes in the final proxy. Furthermore,
amendments to golden parachutes leading up to an SOGP vote could
possibly reflect managerial power of CEOs to extract private benefits
during the last-period deal process.
To estimate the possibility of this delayed consequentiality, we
separate our Execucomp Sample into two groups: firms at which we
found golden parachute amendments during the period beginning one
year prior to the signing of the merger agreement through the SOGP
vote (138 firms) and all other firms (141 firms).
We find that nonamending firms had promised CEOs higher
golden parachutes during the period before the deal than amending
firms. This is consistent with the view that CEOs use the amendment
process to augment relatively low golden parachutes. More tellingly, we
find that firms experiencing golden parachute amendments saw
increases in awards over the prior fiscal year’s of 39% compared with
increases of 21% at nonamending firms. Recall that it is difficult to
determine how much of the year-over-year increase in golden parachute
awards is due to rising equity prices associated with a deal. That
complication should disappear in this analysis as both amending and
nonamending firms should experience similar equity price increases.
The almost double increase in golden parachute awards for amending
firms suggests that amendments are not entered into to respond to
potential shareholder dissent via SOGP, but rather as a way for firms
to increase executive compensation. Of course, it is possible that these
firms would have amended golden parachutes upwards anyway for
firm-specific reasons and SOGP may have constrained them to augment
those awards less than they might have otherwise. 117 In Table 8, the
benchmark year information is provided to give a sense of how the
golden parachute values change. The benchmark year is the fiscal year
prior to either the agreement date or amendment date, whichever is
first.

117. In separate tests we check to see if there are meaningful differences between the firms
that ultimately amend and those that do not across commonly used variables on firm and CEO
characteristics. Along these lines, we only find that firms that ultimately amend their GPs tend to
have longer-tenured CEOs as of the beginning of the two-year period before a deal. This may mean
that more entrenched CEOs are better able to extract augmentations ahead of deals. Alternatively,
it may mean that amending CEOs were employed under more “stale” contracts with off-market
GP promises.
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TABLE 8: GOLDEN PARACHUTE AMENDMENTS

Mean
Firms Without Amendments
DEF 14A Total Value
DEF 14A Cash
DEF 14A Equity
DEF 14A Perks Benefits
Execucomp GP
(Year of Vote)
Execucomp GP
(Benchmark Year)
Execucomp GP
(Benchmark Year-1)
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp
GP (Benchmark Year)
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp
GP (Benchmark Year-1)
Firms With Amendments
DEF 14A Total Value
DEF 14A Cash
DEF 14A Equity
DEF 14A Perks Benefits
Execucomp GP
(Year of Vote)
Execucomp GP
(Benchmark Year)
Execucomp GP
(Benchmark Year-1)
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp
GP (Benchmark Year)
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp
GP (Benchmark Year-1)

10th
90th
Percentile Median Percentile

N

20,536.21
6,075.70
12,825.56
294.22

3,812.38
1,036.25
957.73
0.00

14,044.64 44,910.76
4,600.00 11,155.94
8,028.19 30,341.46
46.48
212.17

141
141
141
140

18,604.42

3,388.00

13,116.34 39,869.23

134

17,327.10

3,388.00

11,325.91 39,053.35

138

16,876.76

2,464.92

10,997.76

134

34,596.92

2.06

0.69

1.21

2.34

134

2.22

0.66

1.25

2.79

129

21,214.84
6,930.60
12,508.08
89.3

4,243.49
962.3
1,005.99
0.00

15,196.94 43,856.29
5,324.60 14,641.23
8,557.51 27,643.61
35.36
198.53

138
138
138
138

17,420.64

1,697.35

12,758.23 40,214.38

132

14,949.40

1,434.27

11,112.69 32,452.60

132

13,897.92

1,190.95

10,509.81

128

31,625.00

5.29

0.70

1.39

4.64

125

2.61

0.66

1.63

5.66
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III. MAKING SOGP MORE EFFECTIVE
For those who believe that golden parachutes generally reflect
the result of arms-length bargaining and are therefore apt to be
efficient, the ineffectiveness of SOGP in constraining them is little or
no cause for concern. For those in that camp, the greater tendency of (a)
ISS to apply one-size-fits-all criteria to its recommendations and (b)
shareholders to delegate voting decisions to ISS (or other proxy advisory
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firms) in SOGP votes might be initially troubling. But the apparent
unwillingness of firms to change their CEO contracts limits the
problematic impact of those phenomena. For those who believe that
golden parachutes are more pernicious, however, SOGP seems to be
largely ineffective. Although the following policy suggestions are
directed more at the latter camp, regardless of where one stands on the
issue, there is still room for improvement by making SOGP more
effective. The proposals focus on two large areas: (1) making SOGP
binding and (2) attempting to harness the implicit and reputational
effects on the target and acquiring companies’ directors. We discuss
these in turn.
A. Making SOGP Vote “Binding”
The key features that prove problematic for SOGP are its
advisory nature and that it necessarily occurs in the firm’s final period
when no second-stage discipline of recalcitrant directors and CEOs is
readily available. One possible solution would be to make SOGP (at
least partially) binding. An important difference between SOP and
SOGP is that while SOP asks the shareholders to vote on the previous
year’s executive pay, SOGP is prospective, asking the shareholders to
express their opinions on the parachute payments that are to be made
once the change-in-control transaction closes in the (near) future.118
Making the SOGP vote binding would attempt to utilize this important
difference.
In terms of how strongly the golden parachute payment would
depend on the shareholder vote (or the trigger threshold), we can
consider different degrees. One possibility is to put the shareholder vote
on golden parachutes on par with the shareholder vote on the
transaction by making the entire parachute payment depend on
clearing the approval threshold. For instance, if the transaction
requires the approval of at least a majority of the outstanding stock,
SOGP can adopt the same threshold. Furthermore, if the golden
parachute proposal fails to satisfy the threshold, the failure would deny
the entire severance payment to the executives. Another possibility is
to impose some type of supermajority denial (or submajority approval)
structure or to deny the executives the portion of the payment that
exceeds the golden parachute payment previously disclosed as part of
an SOP vote. (Or these two approaches could be combined.) Under this

118. See discussion supra Section I.B. In order to implement this change, given that the federal
securities law focuses on disclosure and does not (at least directly) deal with firm’s governance
issues, we will have to make a necessary change in the corporate law.
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proposal, the executives are still “guaranteed” some severance payment
and the additional, amended payment will be denied only in
“exceptional” cases, such as when more than two-thirds or threequarters of the shareholders disapprove the payment.
With respect to making the SOGP vote binding, the most
challenging aspect is dealing with the impact of the uncertainty a
binding vote would impose on the target executives. Assuming that
target CEOs require the insurance that golden parachutes provide,
binding SOGP votes could possibly reduce the value of those provisions.
Faced with substantial uncertainty, perhaps valuable deals would be
missed, or perhaps CEOs would require more compensation in other
corners of their employment contracts (such as their annual stock or
other compensation). The uncertainty problem would be starker in a
regime where the approval threshold is relatively high and when the
failure to secure the threshold implies denial of the entire golden
parachute payment. The problem could be substantially mitigated if the
system utilized a supermajority disapproval threshold (e.g., more than
two-thirds or three-quarters of shares must disapprove the GP
payment) and, more importantly, if the approval is with respect to only
the additional, incremental portion.
Even under the existing regulatory structure, firms and
executives can increase the certainty of golden parachutes by getting
approval for those promises (even the ones about additional
compensation) in the immediately prior SOP disclosure and vote. In
fact, as described above, the potential for avoiding an SOGP vote by a
prior cleansing SOP vote preceded by enhanced golden parachute
disclosure is a feature of the law.119 It is noteworthy that few if any
firms have employed this procedure since SOGP came into effect.120 If
SOGP was binding such that a failed SOGP vote led to the loss of
valuable golden parachute promises, firms and their CEOs would
surely utilize this safety valve.
Effectively moving the SOGP vote forward into the prior year’s
SOP vote is not without problems, however. Most importantly, it could
limit the ability of firms to enter into new golden parachutes or
amendments to preexisting golden parachutes immediately prior to a
deal. If they did so, those new provisions would require and be subject
to a binding SOGP vote. Our results suggest that most of these
amendments are increasing payouts to CEOs, but we do not know
whether those increases are efficient.

119. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Second, folding SOGP into a previous SOP vote runs the risk of
bundling different features of a compensation package. Golden
parachutes that might be objectionable enough for shareholders to vote
against in isolation may not be objectionable enough to justify a vote
against a CEO’s entire pay package. Still, the evidence on SOP votes
shows that golden parachute features (tax gross-ups) influence the
recommendations of ISS and shareholder voting. Moreover, even if
bundling causes golden parachutes to be relatively less salient, the
alternative is an advisory SOGP vote that apparently has little effect
on CEO contracting at all.
B. Harnessing Implicit and Reputational Mechanisms
Another possible avenue of making the SOGP vote more effective
is to focus on possible implicit and reputational mechanisms against the
directors. While it is true that the target company directors and
executives are no longer likely to serve the combined entity for large,
publicly traded companies, it is well known that many directors serve
on multiple boards.121 Hence, even when the target firm is disappearing
through a change-in-control transaction, many of the target company
directors will continue serving as directors at other firms. If, for
instance, the fact that the target directors approved an outrageous
golden parachute payment that was voted down by a large majority of
target shareholders is known or disclosed to the other firms where the
target directors continue their service, such information could play an
important role in their reelection possibilities.122 If so, this could exert
some pressure on the target directors to disapprove outsized golden
parachute payments (or to disapprove amendments at the last minute
in favor of the executives). A similar logic could also apply to departing
target executives, who would continue serving as executives at other
firms or would do so in the future. Disclosing such information could
potentially reduce the target executives’ attractiveness in the labor
market.123

121. See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Outside Directors’ Protection,
46 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 140–52 (2017) (documenting the frequency of directors serving on multiple
boards and showing how such board interlocks can function as a propagation mechanism).
122. See Baker & Choi, Reputation and Litigation, supra note 25, at 47–48 (explaining that
legal mechanisms can provide relevant information to market participants so as to facilitate
market-based reputational incentives).
123. A supplementary mechanism might be to require the target directors to justify the
parachute payments when they receive substantial negative votes from the shareholders.
Currently, the target directors can simply go ahead and make the GP payments, even when a large
majority of shareholders object under SOGP, without providing any explanation whatsoever. By
requiring them to offer proper justifications on why they are not being responsive to the target
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Another possibility is to focus on the directors and executives of
the acquiring corporation. Although in many cases the acquiring
corporation’s shareholders do not get to vote on the transaction,124 if the
fact that the target executives received outsized severance payments (at
least part of which is borne by the acquiring corporation) is disclosed to
the acquiring corporation’s shareholders, they could impose some
discipline against their own directors, who, in turn, might become more
hesitant in agreeing to a large golden parachute in deal negotiations.
Especially when the severance pay would trigger negative tax
consequences, such as nondeduction of payment or additional excise
liability combined with a tax gross-up, highlighting such negative
consequences to the acquiring corporation’s shareholders could induce
them to become more vigilant regarding the target executives’ golden
parachute payments.
Of course, nothing in the current SOGP regime prevents these
sorts of soft sanctions from being imposed. SOGP votes and the
underlying contractual promises are already public but not readily
available to the shareholders of interlock or acquiring corporations.
Under the current regime, shareholders or their advisors would have to
focus on such voting results independently or have their attention
drawn to such matters by disclosure requirements that call for
information about happenings at (a) directors’ interlocked firms and (b)
acquired firms, respectively. Our proposals would make it easier for the
shareholders at interlocked or acquiring corporations to obtain
information about the GP payments and SOGP votes at target
companies.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate role for shareholders in monitoring executive
compensation has proven to be a durable controversy in corporate law
and corporate governance. In particular, shareholder voting on
executive compensation has proliferated of late and has led to
surprising consequences in some instances. This Essay extends the
analysis of shareholder voting to a previously unexplored area—Say On
Golden Parachute. The empirical analyses conducted to this point on
Say on Pay have shown generally positive results for shareholder

shareholders’ disapproval, and by disclosing such information to the other shareholders (for whom
the target directors also serve on the board), we can further boost the implicit disciplinary
mechanism.
124. This is largely due to the fact that an acquiring corporation would utilize a wholly owned
subsidiary to merge with (or acquire shares of) the target corporation in a triangular structure.
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involvement in the compensation process despite SOP being merely
advisory.
Our analysis of the experience with SOGP is not as positive. We
find little evidence that SOGP is having significant effects on golden
parachute contracting. Foremost, we show that since the adoption of
SOGP, the incidence and dollar values of golden parachutes have
increased. We find little evidence that firms resisted amending their
golden parachutes downward until a vote was imminent. In fact, we
find that firms facing imminent votes that amended their golden
parachutes experienced greater year-over-year award increases than
did firms that did not amend.
There are also softer signs of SOGP’s inconsequentiality.
Shareholders appear more willing to follow ISS vote recommendations
than they do in the SOP context. This sort of “blind” adherence makes
sense and is quite rational if shareholders do not value SOGP.
Shareholders also appear to bundle considerations of previous firm
performance with SOGP votes, an approach that does not seem
coherent given the premise of SOGP. Finally, ISS voting
recommendations seem to adopt more of a one-size-fits-all approach,
turning on the presence of tax gross-ups and the golden parachute
reaching a threshold level. This streamlined approach is susceptible to
numerous interpretations, but perhaps the most charitable is that the
proxy advisory firm is economizing on its decisionmaking process with
respect to a decision it deems relatively unimportant.
This apparent inconsequentiality is not simply due to SOGP’s
advisory nature. Experience with SOP seems to show that advisory
votes can work in certain circumstances. SOGP’s apparent failure to
constrain golden parachutes suggests that the differences between the
two regimes, in particular SOGP’s “last-period” nature, make such
provisions an inapt target for an advisory mechanism. In tackling these
two issues—SOGP’s nonbinding nature and the last-period problem—
we propose several policy measures that attempt to at least mitigate
the problems, including making SOGP (at least partially) binding and
also utilizing implicit discipline mechanisms against the directors of the
target and acquiring companies. None of the proposals are free from
possible challenges, however. We have addressed some of those above
but recognize that deep disagreements about shareholder power over
executives remain.

